許多公司治理專家非常關(guān)注與董事會(huì)相關(guān)的問題，因?yàn)槎聲?huì)需要監(jiān)督一家企業(yè)的方方面面(如戰(zhàn)略、資本結(jié)構(gòu)、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、績(jī)效等)，肩負(fù)著招聘和辭退CEO之責(zé)。接下來，小編給大家準(zhǔn)備了關(guān)于董事會(huì)的訛傳雙語,歡迎大家參考與借鑒。

　　關(guān)于董事會(huì)的訛傳雙語

　　由于董事會(huì)具有如此重要的地位，人們都希望企業(yè)在挑選董事會(huì)成員時(shí)能夠遵循一些最佳實(shí)踐，其中一些是監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和股票交易所的強(qiáng)制要求，還有一些是來自各路專家的建議。

　　但這些“最佳實(shí)踐”未必總能提高董事會(huì)的效率或質(zhì)量，現(xiàn)在就讓我們揭穿7個(gè)所謂“最佳實(shí)踐”的真相。

　　訛傳1：董事長(zhǎng)應(yīng)該始終獨(dú)立

　　企業(yè)治理領(lǐng)域流傳最廣的信條之一，就是一家企業(yè)的CEO不應(yīng)兼任董事長(zhǎng)。過去10年里，許多股東要求標(biāo)普500指數(shù)成分股公司剝離這兩個(gè)職位，此類委托提案高達(dá)300多份。迪士尼、摩根大通和美國(guó)銀行等知名企業(yè)都收到過類似提案。

　　許多企業(yè)都遵從了這種要求。2014年，在標(biāo)普500指數(shù)成分股公司中，CEO兼任董事長(zhǎng)的企業(yè)只占53%，較2005年的71%大幅降低。在同一時(shí)間段內(nèi)，由完全獨(dú)立的外部人士出任董事長(zhǎng)的企業(yè)則由9%上升至28%。

　　盡管有些人認(rèn)為，保持獨(dú)立有利于董事長(zhǎng)對(duì)企業(yè)和管理層進(jìn)行更嚴(yán)格的監(jiān)督，然而研究證據(jù)并不支持這一結(jié)論。一項(xiàng)研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，董事長(zhǎng)是否獨(dú)立與企業(yè)運(yùn)營(yíng)績(jī)效并無統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)關(guān)聯(lián)。另一項(xiàng)研究則表明，沒有證據(jù)顯示這種獨(dú)立地位的改變(不管是讓兩個(gè)職位合并還是剝離)會(huì)影響企業(yè)未來的運(yùn)營(yíng)績(jī)效。有研究甚至發(fā)現(xiàn)，強(qiáng)迫剝離董事長(zhǎng)與CEO職權(quán)，對(duì)企業(yè)的運(yùn)營(yíng)績(jī)效實(shí)際是有害的。那些迫于投資者壓力而拆分了這兩項(xiàng)職權(quán)的企業(yè)，往往會(huì)在宣布決定的日期前后得到負(fù)面回報(bào)，運(yùn)營(yíng)績(jī)效也會(huì)隨之降低。

　　訛傳2：分期分級(jí)董事會(huì)制度必然不利于股東

　　很多人認(rèn)為，分期分級(jí)董事會(huì)制度(又稱董事輪換制)使管理層感受不到市場(chǎng)壓力，因而不利于股東。在分期分級(jí)董事會(huì)架構(gòu)下，董事會(huì)實(shí)際上是三年一選而不是一年一選，因?yàn)槊磕赀x舉的董事只占董事會(huì)的三分之一。由于大多數(shù)董事無法在一年內(nèi)替換，收購(gòu)者也就無法在短期內(nèi)搞定多數(shù)董事。所以說，分期分級(jí)董事會(huì)架構(gòu)實(shí)際上形成了一種強(qiáng)大的反收購(gòu)保護(hù)。正因?yàn)槿绱?，許多企業(yè)管理專家都在批評(píng)這種制度。

　　過去10年內(nèi)，采取分期分級(jí)董事會(huì)制度的企業(yè)大大減少，從2005年的57%下降到了2014年的32%。大盤股是取消這種董事會(huì)制度比例最大的公司類型。誠(chéng)然，分期分級(jí)董事會(huì)在個(gè)別情況下不利于股東，比如有可能阻礙非常劃算的收購(gòu)機(jī)會(huì)，或是鞏固表現(xiàn)不佳的管理層，然而在多數(shù)情況下，這種董事會(huì)架構(gòu)卻能夠改善企業(yè)績(jī)效。比如，它能逼退惡意收購(gòu)者，從而確保企業(yè)的長(zhǎng)期戰(zhàn)略不受干擾;再比如，它能夠保護(hù)管理層承擔(dān)較少的短期壓力，從而使企業(yè)敢于創(chuàng)新和承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，研發(fā)暫時(shí)還不被市場(chǎng)理解的專有技術(shù)。

　　一項(xiàng)研究顯示，分期分級(jí)董事會(huì)制度有助于改善新上市企業(yè)的長(zhǎng)期運(yùn)營(yíng)績(jī)效。此外還有研究表明，該架構(gòu)有助于企業(yè)管理層放手進(jìn)行長(zhǎng)期投資，最終讓公司斬獲最大利益。

　　訛傳3：達(dá)到紐交所獨(dú)立標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的股東才算真正獨(dú)立

　　僅僅由于一名董事滿足紐交所的獨(dú)立董事標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，并不意味著向企業(yè)管理層提供建議或履行監(jiān)督之責(zé)時(shí)，他或她就會(huì)保持真正獨(dú)立的態(tài)度。

　　在2009年的一項(xiàng)研究中，研究者分別對(duì)符合紐交所標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的獨(dú)立董事(形式獨(dú)立)和那些在教育、經(jīng)驗(yàn)、提拔等方面與CEO沒有關(guān)聯(lián)的董事(社交獨(dú)立)進(jìn)行了調(diào)查。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)，與CEO有社交關(guān)系的董事，不管是否符合紐交所的獨(dú)董標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，都有可能會(huì)過于信任或依賴CEO，從而在行事上有失偏頗。另外他們更有可能向CEO支付更多薪水，同時(shí)更不愿意辭退運(yùn)營(yíng)績(jī)效不佳的CEO。

　　其他一些研究也給出了類似的結(jié)論。比如一份研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，由CEO指定的董事更可能認(rèn)同CEO的決定，因此他們的獨(dú)立度更低。在現(xiàn)任CEO任期內(nèi)任命的董事成員比例越大，董事會(huì)監(jiān)管職能的效果就越差。雖然獨(dú)立是外部董事的一個(gè)重要品質(zhì)，但紐交所的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)未必能真正衡量出一名董事究竟獨(dú)立與否。

　　訛傳4：連鎖董事會(huì)降低公司治理質(zhì)量

　　所謂“連鎖董事”(Interlocked directorship)，是指A公司某位高管擔(dān)任B公司的董事，B公司某位高管又擔(dān)任了A公司的董事。企業(yè)管理專家經(jīng)常批評(píng)連鎖董事現(xiàn)象會(huì)產(chǎn)生“你好我好大家好”的心理，從而削弱董事會(huì)的獨(dú)立性和監(jiān)督職能。雖然有些證據(jù)顯示，連鎖董事的確會(huì)造成這種現(xiàn)象，但也有研究表明，連鎖董事也可以有利于股東。

　　連鎖董事可以在董事之間建立起一張網(wǎng)絡(luò)，從而促進(jìn)信息，以及戰(zhàn)略、運(yùn)營(yíng)和監(jiān)督最佳實(shí)踐在相關(guān)公司之間流通。另外，連鎖董事的網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)也可以作為企業(yè)重要的業(yè)務(wù)關(guān)系渠道，為企業(yè)介紹新客戶和供應(yīng)商，并有助于企業(yè)獲得人才、資本和政治關(guān)系。

　　有研究表明，連鎖董事的網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)提高了風(fēng)投行業(yè)的績(jī)效。同時(shí)，如果幾家企業(yè)在高管層和董事層分享了關(guān)系網(wǎng)，那么他們的投資政策往往更趨于近似，盈利水平也更高。還有一些研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，董事會(huì)與董事會(huì)之間的連鎖關(guān)系會(huì)帶來更成功的并購(gòu)、更高的運(yùn)營(yíng)績(jī)效以及更高的股價(jià)回報(bào)。

　　訛傳5：CEO是最好的董事

　　許多專家都相信CEO是最好的董事，因?yàn)樗麄兊墓芾碇R(shí)使他們能為企業(yè)各方面的監(jiān)督指導(dǎo)提供廣泛的幫助，比如在戰(zhàn)略、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理、接班人計(jì)劃、績(jī)效評(píng)估、股東與利益相關(guān)者關(guān)系等方面。股東們往往也相信這一點(diǎn)，因此每當(dāng)有CEO被任命為董事，股東的反應(yīng)都比較積極。但從經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)上看，這個(gè)結(jié)論還有待商榷。

　　研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，沒有證據(jù)能夠表明CEO董事能為企業(yè)的遠(yuǎn)期運(yùn)營(yíng)績(jī)效或決策做出更突出的貢獻(xiàn)。研究還發(fā)現(xiàn)，CEO董事往往傾向于給CEO開更高的薪水。另外，海德思哲公司和斯坦福大學(xué)巖石企業(yè)治理中心聯(lián)合進(jìn)行的一項(xiàng)調(diào)查表明，大多數(shù)的董事都認(rèn)為，在職CEO往往忙于自己公司的事，沒法成為一名有效的董事會(huì)成員。過去15年里，在企業(yè)新招募的獨(dú)董中，在職CEO的比重已經(jīng)有所下降。很多企業(yè)都在招募低于CEO級(jí)別的高管或退休CEO擔(dān)任董事。

　　訛傳6：董事承擔(dān)著重大的債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)

　　三分之二的董事認(rèn)為，近年來董事面臨的債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)呈上升勢(shì)頭，有15%的董事因擔(dān)心該職務(wù)有可能帶來個(gè)人債務(wù)而曾經(jīng)認(rèn)真考慮過辭職。不過，實(shí)際上，由董事掏私人腰包償還公司債務(wù)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)還是比較低的。通過董事補(bǔ)償協(xié)議和董事與高管責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)等措施，董事們實(shí)際上被給予了相當(dāng)程度的保護(hù)。董事補(bǔ)償協(xié)議規(guī)定，當(dāng)企業(yè)遭到股東集體訴訟，或陷入與信托義務(wù)有關(guān)的案件時(shí)，只要董事確系秉誠(chéng)行事，企業(yè)就得補(bǔ)償董事的損失。董事與高管責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)又加了一層額外保護(hù)，該保險(xiǎn)的賠付范圍包括訴訟費(fèi)用、調(diào)解費(fèi)用和一定限額內(nèi)的損失賠償。事實(shí)證明，這些手段能夠有效保護(hù)董事個(gè)人為企業(yè)“背鍋”。

　　一項(xiàng)研究顯示，在1980年到2005年的25年間，外部董事個(gè)人為企業(yè)承擔(dān)債務(wù)的案例(即沒有獲得補(bǔ)償和保險(xiǎn)賠償)僅有12起。后續(xù)研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，在2006年至2010年間的所有訴訟中，沒有一位外部董事自掏腰包為企業(yè)“背鍋”(雖然目前有些案件仍在審理)。研究人員總結(jié)道：“在最新的保險(xiǎn)政策保護(hù)下，董事個(gè)人承擔(dān)債務(wù)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是很低的。對(duì)于表現(xiàn)不佳的外部董事來說，最大的威脅是訴訟帶來的時(shí)間成本、事態(tài)的進(jìn)一度惡化，以及對(duì)名譽(yù)的潛在影響，而非直接的經(jīng)濟(jì)損失。”

　　訛傳7：公司的失敗總是董事會(huì)的錯(cuò)

　　為了讓公司產(chǎn)生可以接受的回報(bào)率，企業(yè)必須要承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，而風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偶爾也會(huì)導(dǎo)致失敗。如果失敗是由于戰(zhàn)略不成熟、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)得太多、監(jiān)督疲軟或公然欺詐導(dǎo)致的，那么我們可以，也應(yīng)該將失敗的責(zé)任歸咎于董事會(huì)。但如果失敗是由于競(jìng)爭(zhēng)壓力、市場(chǎng)的意外變動(dòng)導(dǎo)致的，甚至如果我們?cè)揪皖A(yù)計(jì)到了可能出現(xiàn)較差的結(jié)果，那么責(zé)任就在管理層身上，或者純粹是運(yùn)氣不佳。

　　即便就董事會(huì)的監(jiān)督職能而言，董事會(huì)也未必能發(fā)現(xiàn)每一起瀆職事件的征兆。董事會(huì)掌握的企業(yè)運(yùn)營(yíng)信息是有限的，它主要依賴管理層提供的信息來了解他們的決策。除了少數(shù)情況下，董事會(huì)一般不會(huì)“越界”尋找信息(比如除非收到了舉報(bào)，或是基于對(duì)管理層語言和行動(dòng)的觀察產(chǎn)生了一種不祥之感。)

　　然而，有證據(jù)表明，董事會(huì)還是會(huì)因?yàn)樘潛p而受到懲罰。2005年的一項(xiàng)研究表明，在公司更正財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表后，董事會(huì)成員換人的幾率會(huì)顯著增加，夸大收益的企業(yè)的董事也容易被踢出董事會(huì)。與之類似，在金融危機(jī)期間擔(dān)任大型金融機(jī)構(gòu)(如美國(guó)銀行、美林、摩根斯坦利、美聯(lián)、華盛頓互惠銀行等)的董事，也成為了旨在將他們踢出董事會(huì)的“反對(duì)票”運(yùn)動(dòng)的目標(biāo)。

　　要想確定一名董事到底要承擔(dān)何種程度的責(zé)任，就應(yīng)當(dāng)公正地評(píng)估企業(yè)的失敗究竟是不是由他導(dǎo)致的，究竟是如何導(dǎo)致的，以及是否有理由相信他曾經(jīng)設(shè)法阻止不良后果的發(fā)生。

　　本文作者David F. Larcker是斯坦福大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)教授，Brian Tayan是斯坦福商學(xué)院研究員。

　　Corporate governance experts pay considerable attention to issues involving boards of directors, and with good reason. Boards are responsible for monitoring all aspects of a business (its strategy, capital structure, risk, and performance), hiring and firing the CEO, and answering to shareholders when something goes awry.

　　Because of the importance of these roles, companies are expected to adhere to best practices, some mandated by regulatory standards and stock exchange requirements and some advocated by experts.

　　But these “best practices” don’t always create better board effectiveness or quality. Here we debunk seven of these practices.

　　Myth 1: The chairman should always be independent.

　　One of the most widely held beliefs in corporate governance is that the CEO of a company should not serve as its chairman. In fact, over the last decade, companies in the S&P 500 Index received more than 300 shareholder-sponsored proxy proposals that would require a separation of the two roles. Shareholder groups have targeted prominent corporations including Walt Disney, JP Morgan, and Bank of America to strip their CEOs of the chairman title.

　　Companies, in turn, have moved toward separating the roles. Only 53% of companies in the S&P 500 Index had a dual chairman/CEO in 2014, down from 71% in 2005. Similarly, the prevalence of a fully independent chair increased from 9% to 28% over this period.

　　Despite the belief that an independent chair provides more vigilant oversight of the organization and management, the research evidence does not support this conclusion.One study found no statistical relationship between the independence status of the chairman and operating performance, while another found no evidence that a change in independence status (separation or combination) impacts future operating performance. Additional research actually found that forced separation is detrimentalto firm outcomes: Companies that separate the roles due to investor pressure exhibit negative returns around the announcement date and lower subsequent operating performance.

　　Myth 2: Staggered boards are always detrimental to shareholders.

　　Many believe that staggered boards harm shareholders by insulating management from market pressure. Under a staggered board structure, directors are elected to three-year rather than one-year terms, with one-third of the board standing for election each year. Because a majority of the board cannot be replaced in a single year, staggered boards are a formidable antitakeover protection, and for this reason many governance experts criticize their use. Over the last 10 years, the prevalence of staggered boards has decreased, from 57% of companies in 2005 to 32% in 2014. The largest decline has occurred among large capitalization stocks. While it is true that staggered boards can be detrimental to shareholders in certain settings — such as when they prevent otherwise attractive merger opportunities and entrench a poorly performing management — in other settings they have been shown to improve corporate outcomes. For example, they benefit shareholders when they protect long-term business commitments that would be disrupted by a hostile takeover or when they insulate management from short-term pressure, thereby allowing a company to innovate, take risk, and develop proprietary technology that is not fully understood by the market. One study found staggered boards improve long-term operating performance among newly public companies. Other studies also suggest that staggered boards can benefit companies by committing management to longer investment horizons.

　　Myth 3: Directors who meet NYSE independence standards are independent.

　　Just because a director satisfies the independence standards of the New York Stock Exchange does not mean he or she behaves independently when it comes to advising and monitoring management. For example, a 2009 study examined directors who are independent according to NYSE standards (“conventionally independent”) and those who are independent in their social relation to the CEO based on education, experiences, and upbringing (“socially independent”). The researchers discovered that board members who share social connections can be biased to overly trust or rely on CEOs, regardless of whether they’re considered independent by NYSE standards. Those board members were more likely to pay CEOs more and less likely to fire a CEO following poor operating performance.

　　Other studies reach similar conclusions. One study found that directors appointed by a CEO are more likely to be sympathetic to his or her decisions and therefore less independent. The greater the percentage of the board appointed during the current CEO’s tenure, the worse the board performs its monitoring function. While independence is an important quality for an outside director to have, NYSE standards do not necessarily measure its presence (or absence).

　　Myth 4: Interlocked directorships reduce governance quality.

　　Interlocked directorships occur when an executive of Firm A sits on the board of Firm B while an executive of Firm B sits on the board of Firm A. Corporate governance experts criticize board interlocks as creating psychological reciprocity that compromises independence and weakens oversight. While some evidence suggests that interlocking can create this effect, research also suggests that interlocking can be beneficial to shareholders. Interlocking creates a network among directors that can lead to increased information flow, whereby best practices in strategy, operations, and oversight are transferred across companies. Network effects created by interlocked directorships can also serve as an important conduit for business relations, client and supplier referrals, talent sourcing, capital, and political connections. For example, one study found thatnetwork connections improved performance among companies in the venture capital industry, while another found that companies that share network connections at the senior executive and the director level have greater similarity in their investment policies and higher profitability. These effects disappear when network connections are terminated. Other studies have found board connections lead to more successful mergers and acquisitions, and greater future operating performance and higher future stock price returns.

　　Myth 5: CEOs make the best directors.

　　Many experts believe that CEOs are the best directors because their managerial knowledge allows them to contribute broadly to firm oversight, including strategy, risk management, succession planning, performance measurement, and shareholder and stakeholder relations. Shareholders, too, often have this belief, reacting favorably to the appointment of CEOs to the board. But empirical evidence is less positive. Studies have found no evidence that a CEO board member positively contributes to future operating performance or decision-making and finds CEO directors are associated with higher CEO pay. Additionally, a survey by Heidrick& Struggles and the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University finds that most corporate directors believe that active CEOs are too busy with their own companies to be effective board members. Over the last 15 years, the percentage of newly recruited independent directors with active CEO experience has declined. Companies instead are recruiting new directors who are executives below the CEO level or who are retired CEOs.

　　Myth 6: Directors face significant liability risk.

　　Two-thirds of directors believe that the liability risk of serving on boards has increased in recent years, and 15 percent of directors have thought seriously about resigning due to concerns about personal liability. However, the actual risk of out-of-pocket payment is low. Directors are afforded considerable protection through indemnification agreements and director and officer liability insurance. Indemnification agreements stipulate that the company will pay for costs associated with securities class actions and fiduciary duty cases, provided the director acted in good faith. Insurance provides an additional layer of protection, covering litigation expenses, settlement payments, and, in some cases, amounts paid in damages up to a specified limit. These protections have been shown to be effective in protecting directors from personal liability. One study found that in the 25 years between 1980 and 2005, outside directors made out-of-pocket payments — meaning unindemnified and uninsured — in only 12 cases. A follow-up study of lawsuits filed between 2006 and 2010 finds no cases resulting in out-of-pocket payments by outside directors (although some of these cases are still ongoing). The authors conclude that “directors with state-of-the art insurance policies face little out-of-pocket liability risk. … The principal threats to outside directors who perform poorly are the time, aggravation, and potential harm to reputation that a lawsuit can entail, not direct financial loss.”

　　Myth 7: The failure of a company is always the board’s fault.

　　In order for a company to generate acceptable rates of returns, it must takes risks, and risks periodically lead to failure. If the failure was the result of a poorly conceived strategy, excessive risk taking, weak oversight, or blatant fraud, the board can and should be blamed. But if failure resulted from competitive pressure, unexpected shifts in the marketplace, or even poor results that fall within the range of expected outcomes, then blame lies with management or poor luck.

　　Even within the scope of its monitoring obligations, a board won’t necessarily detect all instances of malfeasance before they occur. The board has limited access to information about the operations of a company. In the absence of “red flags,” it relies on the information provided by management to inform its decisions. A board usually doesn’t seek information beyond this except in a few cases (if it receives whistleblower information, for example, or believes management isn’t setting the right tone through words or behavior).

　　Still, evidence shows boards are punished for losses. A 2005 study showed that director turnover increases significantly following financial restatements and that board members of firms that overstate earnings tend to lose their other directorships as well. Similarly, directors who served on the boards of large financial institutions during the financial crisis (such as Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Wachovia, and Washington Mutual) became targets of “vote no” campaigns to remove them from other corporate boards where they served.

　　The degree to which a director should be held accountable depends on a fair-minded assessment of whether and how the director might have contributed to the failure and whether it is reasonable to believe that he or she could have prevented it.

　　David F. Larcker is the James Irvin Miller Professor of Accounting and Brian Tayan is a researcher at Stanford GSB.